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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The SujiK'iiiiii1 i HI

" i in ii uli. 'ii .il in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2

2|"3){j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

rented for review is whether the Distrcit Court erred, as a matter
*r folding that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee's re|miiM
nniii.ici, fiuiMiiini In !;,

I

I*"! I»»i'« pxeruinry

United States Bankruptcy Code, results in llit1

termination of all future rights and obligations of the debtor and noii-ddilui inii

This issue was decided strictly as a matter of law. Therefore the district
court's ruling is entitletl li mt iieleienui .mil lli't" hsur iituM be decided independently
on appeal. Transamerica Cash Resreve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., !H9 V,1J 11
(Utah 1990).

STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

The statutory provisions that are determinative

11 U.S.C. § 365(a):
Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in
subsections (b)(c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the
court's approvial, may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1):
In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume
or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real
property or of personal property of the debtor within 60 days after
the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for
cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is
deemed rejected.
11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1):
Except as provided in subsection (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the
rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease- if such contract or
lease has not been assumed under this section or under a plan
confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12 or 13 of this title, immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 20, 1990, H. LeRoy Cobabe, Plaintiff and Appellant ("Cobabe") filed
an action in the Fifth Judicial Distrcit Court against Garth and Edward Stanger,
Defendants and Appellees ("Stangers"). The Complaint sought the enforcement of an
Agreement for Consulting Services (the "Agreement" or "Contract") dated April 26,
1988. There being no dispute as to material facts, Cobabe filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment on August 31, 1990 and Stangers subsequently filed a Cross-Motion for
-2cm\071591

Sininiiiemu

ioth Motions were heard by the Honorable Philip J, Eves on

Octobei 18, 1990. Judge Eves took the matter under adviseQR
Memoranduii

I •

Vlotion for Summarv Judgment anv denying

Cobabe's Motion for Summary Judgment, A copy of the Memorandum Dec ISM MI is
attached as Appena
interpretation •** h ^

<

'.ecibiun was based solely upon his

• " uv* United States Bankruptcy ^ d e . A n Uidei Granting

Defendants'

\ the Complaint was entered

.I^LUU

, J ( 'ohabe then filed the instant appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Ii

i, ib i I i i , nl ?ft, VMK H. Leroy Cobabe ("Cobabe") and Garth

Stanger and Edward Stanger ("Stangers") entered into an Agreenieiil lui1 l ""! iMMiif.'
Services

..

.v.* -

*,. Pursuant i

*

isxanh 3 (Record at p MI

,: Agret-men* Cobabe agreed to perform consulting and

advisory ser^Vec o„ ,. ..

Hitters relating to or affecting'

Stangers* acquisition of a dealer agreement with Toyota Motor Distributors, Tnc. and
Stangers* operation of a car dealership

.

^cement

was attached to Plaintiffs Complaint and was also produced pursuant to Plaintiffs
Response to Defendants' First Request for Admissions, i"li!< i "^jit'tii^ i

i for

Pun I m in HI <il I KM mini in,,, /" i copy of the Agreement is attached as Appendix "A" to
this Brief.
, .
em\07159t
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3. Also pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Stangers agreed to pay
$10,000.00 upon the execution of the Agreement, $4,000.00 a month beginning May 1,
1988 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until September 1, 1988,
at which time Stangers agreed to pay the sum of $13,000.00. Then, beginning on
October 1, 1988, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Stangers agreed to pay
Cobabe the sum of $4,000.00 until May 31, 1991, at which time the Agreement was to
terminate. See Appendix "A".
4. Stangers paid the amounts as required by the terms of the contract up to
and including the monthly payment for October 1, 1989. See Plaintiffs Affidavit,
paragraph 2 (Record at p. 36).
5. On November 1, 1989, Cobabe filed a voluntary petition pursuant to
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See Plaintiffs Reply to
Counterclaim, paragraph 2 (Record at p. 30).
6. Just prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a judgment creditor of
Cobabe, Celia R. Snow ("Snow"), served Stangers with a Writ of Garnishment in an
attempt to attach amounts owing to Cobabe under the Agreement The Writ of
Garnishment was served on October 15, 1989, after the October 1 payment had been
made but before the November 1 payment was due. See Plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraph
3 (Record at p. 37),
7. When Cobabe made demand upon Stangers for the November 1, 1989
payment, Stangers refused to pay citing the Snow Writ of Garnishment. See Plaintiffs
Affidavit, paragraph 4 (Record at p. 37).
.4cm\071591

8. Because of Stangers' refusal to pay, Cobabe was forced to file a Motion
for Order Determining Validity of Garnishment with the Bankruptcy Court on
December 14, 1989, seeking an order of the court determining that the Snow Writ of
Garnishment was invalid as to post-petition earnings of Cobabe and that the postpetition earnings of Cobabe under the Agreement were not property of the bankruptcy
estate but were the property of Cobabe personally and that he was entitled to receive
the same. See Exhibit "B" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 61).
9. A hearing on the Motion was scheduled for December 21, 1989 and a
Notice of Hearing was given to Snow and Stangers on December 14, 1989. See Exhibits
"C" and "D" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 68 & 69).
10. Prior to the hearing, a Stipulation Regarding Writ of Garnishment was
entered into between Cobabe and Snow whereby the parties agreed that the Writ had
no force and effect as to Cobabe's post-petition earnings. An order of the court
approving the stipulation was entered on December 21, 1989. See Exhibits "Eft and "F"
to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment (record at p. 71 and 73).
11. Stangers failed to appear at the hearing before the Bankruptcy Court on
December 21, 1989. Based upon the proffer of evidence, the court found that amounts
owed by Stangers to Cobabe on or after November 1, 1989 were not property of the
bankruptcy estate but were instead post-petition earnings belonging to Cobabe in his
-5cm\071591

individual capacity. Based upon these findings, the court ordered Stangers to
immediately pay over to Cobabe the funds representing post-petition earnings that were
being held by Stangers. A copy of the proposed order was mailed to Stangers on
December 21, 1989, and no objection to the form of the order having been filed, the
court entered the order on January 5, 1990. See Exhibit "G" to Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at p.
75).
12. A copy of the conformed order was sent to Stangers by the clerk of the
court on January 5, 1990. However, Stangers ignored the order and refused to pay over
to Cobabe those amounts ordered by the court After repeated demands made
personally by Cobabe, the Stangers continued to refuse to make payment and Cobabe
was forced to file a Motion for Order to Show Cause with supporting affidavit. See
plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 8 (Record at p. 37 and 38). Based upon these
pleadings, Judge Boulden issued an Order to Show Cause ordering Stangers to appear
on February 1, 1990 and show cause why they should not be held in contempt for
failure to obey the court's order of January 5, 1990. See Exhibits "H", "I" and "J" to
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record at p. 79, 82 and 84).
13. At the hearing on February 1, 1990, the court heard testimony from both
Cobabe and Stangers. After considering the pleadings, the evidence and the arguments
of counsel, the court entered an order finding that the conduct of Stangers constituted
willful failure to abide by the court's previous order and ordered that Stangers
-6cm\071591

immediately pay to Cobabe, within 24 hours of the order, all amounts due and owing
which represented post-petition earnings. Said order was entered February 2, 1990. See
Exhibit "K" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion
for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 86).
14. Subsequently, Stangers filed a Motion to Stay Enforcement of Ruling on
Contempt This Motion was denied, although the court modified its prior order by
ordering that Stangers pay the funds to Cobabe's counsel, who was to hold the funds for
a period of five days to allow the bankruptcy trustee an opportunity to assert an interest
in the funds if he determined that it was appropriate to do so. See Exhibit "L" to
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record at p. 90).
15. Pursuant to the February 2, 1990 order, Stangers paid to Cobabe's counsel
the sum of $20,300.00, representing monthly payments for November, December,
January and February, plus attorneys' fees of $300.00 as required by the Order. The
trustee never asserted any interest in the funds and the funds were disbursed to Cobabe.
See Plaintiffs Reply to Counterclaim, paragraph 5 and Plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraph 9
(Record at p. 31 and 38).
16. Stangers subsequently filed a Motion For Relief from Order and a
supporting Memorandum, seeking to set aside the Bankruptcy Court's previous orders.
While contesting the Stangers' Motion, Cobabe agreed that the state court would be an
appropriate forum in which to resolve the dispute between the parties and on that basis
alone agreed that the January 5, 1990 order could be vacated. See Exhibit "M" to
-7cm\071591

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment (Record at p. 96).
17. Cobabe then filed this case in the Fifth Judicial District Court and
Stangers raised as an Affirmative Defense the fact that Cobabe's bankruptcy trustee
rejected the contract. See Answer and Counterclaim (Record at p. 11).
18. During the term of the Agreement, Cobabe at all times performed
according to the Agreement and was not in breach of the Agreement, either before or
after his bankruptcy filing. See Plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraph 10 (Record at p. 38).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The validity of the Agreement between Cobabe and Stangers is not affected by
Cobabe's bankruptcy filing nor by the Chapter 7 Trustee's rejection of the Agreement.
The trustee's rejection simply means that the Contract will not become part of the
bankruptcy estate because the trustee has determined that it will not benefit the estate.
Section 365(g)(1) provides that a rejection of an executory contract constitutes
a breach of the contract as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The rejection does
not terminate the contract but only creates the fiction that the contract was breached as
of the filing date in order to allow the non-debtor party to the contract to assert a claim
against the bankruptcy estate.
The Bankruptcy Code does not allow a trustee to repudiate contracts. If an
executory contract was valid and enforceable the day before a bankruptcy filing, it

-8cm\071591

continues to be enforceable, notwithstanding the trustee's rejection of the contract, so
long as the debtor performs according to the terms of the contract.

ARGUMENT
I. THE AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES BETWEEN COBABE
AND STANGERS CONTINUES TO BE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT BY
COBABE'S CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE.

As described in the facts set forth above, Cobabe has been trying for almost
two years to enforce the Consulting Agreement For months Stangers ignored the
bankruptcy process and Court Orders until found in contempt and ordered to perform
their obligations under the Agreement. At no time during the bankruptcy proceeding
did Stangers assert § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.) as a defense
to Cobabe's efforts to enforce the Agreement. (All subsequent statutory references are
to the United States Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise noted.)

When Cobabe

commenced the instant action in Fifth District Court, Stangers resisted Cobabe's efforts
to collect by asserting a bankruptcy defense. Stangers asserted that because Cobabe's
Chapter 7 trustee rejected the Consulting Agreement, the entire Agreement was
terminated. Section 365 codifies the rights and obligations as between a trustee in
bankruptcy and the non-debtor party to an executory contract or unexpired lease and
allows the trustee to either assume or reject an executory contract of the debtor.

-9cm\071591

However, the section does not alter the rights and obligations as between the debtor
and the non-debtor party to the contract.1

A. A CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE'S REJECTION OF THE DEBTOR'S
EXECUTORY CONTRACT DOES NOT TERMINATE THE CONTRACT.
To better understand the purpose and workings of § 365, it is helpful to have
an overview of bankruptcy law. The basic premise of bankruptcy law involves the
collection of the debtor's property by a disinterested third person who will administer it
for the benefit of all creditors. The current Bankruptcy Code accomplishes this transfer
by the creation of an estate upon the filing of a petition by or against the debtor. § 541.
A trustee is then appointed to administer the assets of the estate by collecting and
liquidating all property in which the debtor has an interest, unless the property is of
inconsequential value or burdensome to the estate. §§ 554 and 701.
Creditors who have a right to payment from the debtor as of the date of the
bankruptcy filing are entitled to a distributive share of the estate. The estate may have
its own creditors as well; obligations or expenses incurred in the administration of the
estate. These creditors are entitled to an administrative claim which carries with it a
priority of payment ahead of the debtor's general creditors. Because the debtor's

1

The parties agree that the subject Consulting Agreement is
an executory contract wiwthin the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
A generally accepted definition of an executory contract is one
where the obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material brach excusing performance of the other.

-10cm\071591

personal liability is discharged in the bankruptcy process, any creditor's recovery is
limited to a share of the distribution from the estate.
Within this scheme of bankruptcy administration, executory contracts have
historically received unique treatment. Executory contracts pose a special problem to a
bankruptcy trustee because they embody both an asset-the non-debtor's performance to
be rendered, and a liability—the debtor's obligations under the contract. The
Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee may assume or reject any executory contract
of the debtor. § 365(a). This ability to pick and choose is necessary in order to protect
the estate from becoming burdened with additional liability. If the executory contract
automatically passed into the estate in the same manner as all other property of the
debtor, the estate would acquire an asset-the right to performance from the nondebtor party, but it would also become liable for the corresponding performance
originally due from the debtor. Accordingly, the trustee is given the option to assume
or not assume an executory contract depending upon which course of action will result
in benefit to the estate.
The source of current executory contract doctrine is largely an English case,
Copeland v. Stephens. 106 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1818). Copeland, a lessor of real
property sued to recover rent from Stephens, an assignee of Copeland's original lessee.
Stephens had gone into bankruptcy before the rent became due and argued that the
leasehold interest had passed to his bankruptcy trustee.
The court concluded that the general bankruptcy assignment [for the benefit
of creditors] "does not vest a term of years in the [bankruptcy] assignees, unless they do
-11cm\071591

some act to manifest their assent to the assignment as it regards the term, and their
acceptance of the [leasehold] estate." Id at 222.
The court held that the bankruptcy estate should be protected from the
continuing liabilities of the debtor that would accompany a leasehold interest into the
estate, unless the trustee specifically assented to the lease, as he might if the terms were
favorable and outweighed the liabilities. The trustee therefore had the right to "assume
or refuse" the lease. The debtor's interest in the lease never passed to the trustee
because the trustee did not take any kind of affirmative action.
This principle was adopted by courts of the United States, including the
United States Supreme Court in United States Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Rv.. 150 U.S.
287 (1893):
The general rule applicable to this class of cases is undisputed that
an assignee or receiver is not bound to adopt the contracts, accept
the leases, or otherwise step into the shoes of his assignor, if in his
opinion it would be unprofitable or undesirable to do so; and he is
entitled to a reasonable time to elect whether to adopt or repudiate
such contracts.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals described the application of the law as
follows:
The "effect [of an adjudication in bankruptcy] is to transfer to the trustee all
the property of the bankrupt except his executory contracts, and to vest in the trustee
the option to assume or to renounce these," but it "neither releases not absolves the

-12cm\071591

debtor from any of his contracts or obligations." Watson v. Merrill 136 F. 359 (8th Cir.
1905). The Court further observed:
"Nor are those who contract with [the debtor] absolved from their
obligations. If he or his trustee pays the stipulated rents for his
place of residence or for his place of business, the lessors may not
deny to the payor the use of the premises according to the terms of
the lease." Id. at 363.
In reviewing these principles, it becomes obvious that the defendants have
misunderstood and are attempting to misapply the law regarding executory contracts.
The confusion seems to stem from the use of the word "reject" in the statute. As
previously discussed, the Bankruptcy Code gives to the trustee the option to assume or
reject an executory contract. And, in a Chapter 7 case, if the trustee does not assume
the contract within 60 days of the entry of the order for relief, the contract is deemed
rejected. § 365(d)(1). But a rejection by the trustee, either by direct action or by
operation of law, does not terminate the contract.
To "reject" a contract is simply an election by the trustee, either expressly or
by inaction, to leave matters as they are. The trustee, by rejecting, declines the contract
as an asset of the estate and prevents the estate from becoming obligated pursuant to
the terms of the contract The debtor's obligations are unaffected.
B. A CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE'S REJECTION OF THE DEBTOR'S
EXECUTORY CONTRACT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF THE
CONTRACT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE NONDEBTOR PARTY TO THE CONTRACT TO ASSERT A CLAIM
AGAINST THE ESTATE.

-13cm\071591

The defendants have relied upon the language of §365(g)(l) which provides
that the rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach of such contract as of
the date of the petition. The linking of the word "rejection" and "breach" in this context
has engendered much confusion, but can be understood by again analyzing the purpose
and history of the bankruptcy laws.
As mentioned above, historically, only those creditors with claims against the
debtor, as of the date of the petition, could assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate.
And the purpose of the "assume or refuse" doctrine of executory contracts was to
protect the estate from having to assume obligations on a contract or lease where there
were no corresponding benefits to the estate.
However, this doctrine which protected the estate did not always adequately
protect the non-debtor party to the contract. If the debtor was not in default at the
time of the bankruptcy petition, the non-debtor party to the contract had no claim for
damages against the debtor and therefor no claim against the estate. If the trustee
subsequently decided not to assume the contract, there would be no administrative
claim against the estate because the estate had no obligation under the contract And if
the debtor then breached the contract post-petition, the non-debtor party had no
recourse against the debtor because the debtor received a discharge of his personal
liability.2

2

If the debtor had already breached the contract at the time
of the filing, the non-debtor party would then be entitled to
assert a claim against the estate. Even though the trustee
subsequently rejects the contract, it is still deemed a breach of
the contract as of the date of filing for purposes of asserting a

-14cm\071591

A creditor in this position was left with no remedy. To ameliorate this
situation, the courts created the fiction that upon the filing of the petition, it would be
assumed that the debtor would not perform under the terms of the contract. Thus, if in
fact, the debtor failed to perform post-petition, the other party to the contract was
entitled to a claim against the estate as a general unsecured creditor, as of the date of
the filing of the petition, notwithstanding the fact that the actual breach may have
occurred sometime later. If the trustee assumed the contract during the pendency of
the bankruptcy, the estate itself became obligated to perform under the contract. In
that case, the non-debtor party would not have a claim for non-performance but would
be entitled to a contractual performance from the trustee. However, unless and until
the trustee assumed the contract, the debtor still retained his rights under the contract
and his ability to perform as well as demand performance.
The current Bankruptcy Code has incorporated this concept in § 365(g)(1) by
providing that upon the trustee's determination that rejection of an executory contract is
in the best interest of the estate, such rejection will relate back to the date of the
bankruptcy filing and will be deemed a breach as of that time for purposes of allowing
the non-debtor party to the contract to assert a claim against the estate. It must be
emphasized that a rejection pursuant to §365 does not mean that the contract itself is

claim. S 365(g)(1) clarifies the timing of the breach in order
that the rejection not be construed as a post-petition breach
which would result in a priority claim. Instead, the damage
resulting from the breach is treated as a general unsecured
claim. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Cobabe at
all times complied with the terms of the Agreement and that
Cobabe was not in breach of the Agreemenet at the time of his
bankruptcy filing.
-15cm\071591

rejected or repudiated. It means that the trustee will not assume the debtor's obligation
to perform and that the non-debtor party to the contract can treat the contract as
breached for purposes of asserting a claim against the estate.
Take, for example, a debtor who is obligated to produce and sell widgets
under an executory contract. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the debtor is current
with its contractual obligations. After the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee
of the debtor's estate determines that the contract holds no benefit for the estate and
therefore he rejects it. Subsequently, the debtor is unable to perform. In such a case,
the other party to the contract is entitled to a claim for damages which can be asserted
against the bankruptcy estate. The right to damages does not arise because the trustee
rejected the contract, but because the debtor failed to perform under the terms of the
contract. If the debtor had instead continued to perform under the contract, there
would be no damages and the creditor would not have a claim against the estate,
notwithstanding the trustee's "rejection". The language of § 365(g)(1) simply creates the
fiction that whenever the breach occurs, it will be deemed to be effective as of the date
of filing.
C. § 365 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT GIVE A CHAPTER 7
TRUSTEE THE POWER TO REPUDIATE THE DEBTOR'S EXECUTORY
CONTRACTS.
Case law is replete with examples of debtors who are seeking to escape the
obligations of their contracts, both executory and executed. And the Bankruptcy Code
allows debtors to accomplish this by granting them a discharge. But where the debtor
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wishes to perform, as in the instant case, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide an
excuse for the non-debtor party to breach the contract.
In the case of In Re Knight 8 B.R. 925 (1981), the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Maryland was faced with a similar situation where the Chapter 7 trustee did
not assume the debtor's residential lease. The court considered the specific language of
§365(g)(l) stating that the trustee's rejection of a lease was deemed to be a breach of
the lease as of the date of the filing of the petition. The Court considered several
interpretations of this language and determined that the trustee's rejection did not
constitute a termination of the lease that would justify the landlord's nonperformance.
"[Such a reading] would adopt a policy that allows a landlord to evict tenants
regardless of default solely on the basis that the tenant has sought relief under the
Code. Such an inequitable result could not have been intended." Id at 929. The court
held that the landlord could not treat the lease as breached by the debtor based solely
on the trustee's rejection.
The breach described in subsection (g)(1) is deemed a breach for the sole
purpose of allowing the non-debtor party to the contract the legal opportunity to assert
a claim against the estate. Such a rejection is not a cancellation of the contract and the
non-debtor party must continue to honor the contract unless the debtor actually
commits a breach of the lease or contract
Similarly, where the debtor has pledged his rights under a lease, the trustee's
rejection of the lease does not destroy the underlying leasehold estate. The rejection
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merely puts the lease and its performance outside of the bankruptcy administration. In
re Garfinkle. 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978).
Bankruptcy law does not give a trustee the power to repudiate contracts. The
trustee only has the ability to determine whether the estate should become liable under
the terms of the contract in order to accede to its benefits. And bankruptcy law
certainly does not give a non-debtor party to a contract the right to treat a contract as
breached simply because the debtor has filed a petition.
The concepts set forth above include a general summary of the analysis
contained in an article entitled "Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
'Rejection'", 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845 (1988), a thoughtful commentary on § 365, its
history and application. Many of the ideas espoused in this Brief have been liberally
borrowed from the article and counsel acknowledges said contribution as an important
source fo the work herein.
Allowing the District Court's construction of the statutory language to prevail
would result in a grave injustice and would stand on its ear the bankruptcy policy of a
fresh start for the debtor. If the non-debtor party to a contract or lease can treat the
agreement as terminated regardless of the debtor's actual conduct, all debtors will be in
jeopardy of losing their jobs and possibly their homes.
The Knight case illustrates the potential problem involved where a debtor has
a residential lease of an apartment. In such a situation, there is no reason for a trustee
to assume the lease because there could be no benefit to the estate. But can the
landlord treat the lease as terminated upon the trustee's rejection when the tenant is in
-18cm\071591

compliance with the terms of the lease? Can the landlord evict the tenant based upon
nothing more than a bankruptcy filing? The answer must be "No".
Unless the District Court decision is overturned, the same skewed result
occurs in the employment arena. Obviously, a Chapter 7 trustee would not assume a
debtor's employment contract. In most cases, he would be prohibited from doing
because § 365(c) prohibits the assumption of personal service contracts. So if the
trustee took no action, § 365(d)(1) would deem the contract rejected. To follow the
lower court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, an employer could then refuse to pay
an employee who had continued to work after filing bankruptcy asserting that the
employment contract had been automatically severed by the filing of the bankruptcy
case and the trustee's rejection. Such a result could never have been intended by the
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, such a result contravenes the proscription of §
525(b) which prohibits discrimination by a private employer because of an employee's
bankruptcy filing.
In the instant case, the Consulting Agreement was an employment contract
between Cobabe and Stangers. Even though Cobabe was denominated as an
independent contractor and not legally an employee, the contract provided Cobabe with
his only source of employment To allow Stangers to repudiate their obligations under
the Agreement when there has been absolutely no breach on the part of Cobabe flies in
the face of reason and equity. Section 365 does not require such a result and this Court
should not torture the statutory interpretation to reach such a result
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CONCLUSION
The Agreement for Consulting Services entered into by Cobabe and Stangers
is an enforceable contract. Cobabe has never breached the terms of the contract and
has at all times been ready, willing and able to perform his duties under the contract.
The Chapter 7 Trustee's refusal to assume the contract as property of the bankruptcy
estate has no impact upon the parties' rights and obligations under the contract.
The rejection by the trustee constitutes a breach of the agreement only for the
purpose of allowing Stangers to make a claim against the estate, if at any time Stangers
may have a claim to assert.
Section 365 does not give a trustee the power to terminate a contract.
However, the District Court's decision enables a trustee to repudiate a debtor's
executory contract regardless of the debtor's conduct. In this case, such a decision
allows Stangers to breach the contract with impunity and leaves Cobabe without a
remedy for such breach. Such a result is contrary to law and equity. For these reasons,
this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and enforce the terms of the
contract between the parties.
DATED this

of July, 1991.

wnery
of and fc
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following on this
July, 1991.

William T. Thurman, Esq.
McKay, Burton & Thurman
10 East South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
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Tab A

AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES

This Agreement is made this

day of April, 1988

between Garth Stanger and Edward Stanger ("Stanger") and H.
LeRoy Cobabe

("Consultant").
RECITALS

WHEREAS, Stanger is currently in the business of
buying and selling automobiles and is desirous of operating a
dealership located in St. George, Utah and is also desirous of
entering into a Dealer Agreement with Toyota Motor
Distributors, Inc. ("Toyota") and
WHEREAS, Consultant has extensive experience in the
area of buying and selling automobiles, as well as operating
and managing a dealership, and
WHEREAS, Stanger desires to have Consultant provide
services including assistance in entering into a Dealer
Agreement with Toyota and assistance and advice in operating,
maintaining and managing the St. George dealership, and
WHEREAS, Consultant agrees to perform these services
under the terms and conditions set forth below;
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set
forth herein, the parties hereto agree as follows:

1.

Consultant will perform consulting and advisory

services on behalf of Stanger with respect to all matters
relating to or affecting Stanger's acquisition of a Dealer
Agreement with Toyota and Stanger's operation of a car
dealership in St. George.
2.

Consultant's services will be rendered largely in

St. George, Utah, but Consultant will, on request, perform
services at such other places as required or as designated by
Stanger.
3.

In the performance of the services, the hours

Consultant is to work on any given day will be entirely within
Consultant's control and Stanger will rely upon Consultant to
put in such number of hours as is reasonably necessary to
fulfill the spirit and purpose of this agreement.
4.

Stanger agrees to pay Consultant the sum of

$10,000.00 upon the execution of this Agreement for services
performed to date.

Stanger shall then pay to Consultant a

monthly salary of $4,000.00 beginning on May 1, 1988 and
continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until
September 1, 1988, when Stanger shall pay to Consultant
$13,000.00.

Thereafter, Stanger shall pay to Consultant

$4,000.00 on the first day of each and every month until May
31, 1991, at which time this Agreement shall terminate.
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5.

This Agreement provides for the performance of

services by Consultant as an independent contractor.

Nothing

in this Agreement shall be in any way construed to be
inconsistent with this relationship or status.
6.

Consultant agrees to hold Stanger harmless from

any and all liability for withholding state or federal income
tax, state or federal industrial accident contributions and any
employees tax liability now or subsequently imposed on Stanger.
7.

Nothing contained herein shall limit Consultant's

right to enter into other employment agreements provided that
the work to be performed under such other agreements shall not
conflict with Consultant's duties under this Agreement.
8.

Stanger's obligation to make monthly payments as

set forth in this Agreement shall terminate upon Toyota's
refusal to enter into a Dealer Agreement with Stanger.
9.

The entire agreement between the parties with

respect to the subject matter herein is contained in this
Agreement.

The provisions of this Agreement are solely for the

benefit of the parties hereto and not for the benefit of any
other person, persons or entities.
10.

No waiver, alteration or modification of any of

the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding unless in
writing and signed by the parties hereto.
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11.

Ag

All notices and communi

reement shall be se

cations regarding this

nt to the parties as follows:

Garth Stanger
Edward Stanger
3655 Lupin Way
St. George, Utah

84770

^02ies°oyuthObvaaieiey View Drive, #116
St. George, Utah 84770

12.

ed by the laws of
This Agreement shall be gove rn

the State of Utah.
DATED this

, 1988.

day of

Garth Stanger

Edward Stanger

H. LeRoy Cobabe

?V 7

^

Un.'S S

^ B«.K,up«y CouM

Attest: , J
6521m

vl-<

Deputy ClerK
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I!' THE CISTPICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
H. LeROY COBABE,
Plaintiff,

)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
)

GARTH STANGER and
EDWARD STANGER,

Civil No. 900503248

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on October 18, 1990,
the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, en cross Motions for
Summary Judgment.

The Plaintiffs were represented by Carolyn

Montgomery, their attorney of record and the Defendants by Joel T.
Marker, their attorney of record.

The Court heard extensive oral

argument and then took the matter under submission.

The Court has

now reviewed the file in its entirety including the article
entitled Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding
"Rejection", by Michael T. Andrew which was submitted by Plaintiff
and the copies of statutes and cases cited in opposition to the
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by counsel for
the defense.

The Court being fully advisee in the premises now

enters the following Decision and Order.

This case places this Court in a rather unusual position
of being required to decide a hotly disputed issue of Federal
Bankruptcy Law which is really the only legal issue presented by
either side in their Motions for Summary Judgment.
explanation of the facts would appear appropriate.

A brief
These are the

facts to which the parties have agreed there is no dispute.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
On or about April 26th, 1988, the parties entered into
an agreement for consulting services, (the agreement), wherein the
Plaintiff agreed to act as consultant for the Defendants who were
purchasing a Toyota dealership from the Plaintiff.

The agreement

contained provisions for compensation to the Plaintiff from the
Defendants.

Both sides kept up their obligations under the

agreement through the month of October, 1989.

On November 1,

1989, the Plaintiff filed bankruptcy in response to a Writ of
Garnishment which was served on the Defendants by a prevailing
party in another lawsuit with the Plaintiff therein seeking to
garnish the payments due from these Defendants to this Plaintiff.
Thereafter, these Defendants refused to make any more payrents
under the agreement with this Plaintiff and the matter wound up
before the Federal Bankruptcy Court on a Motion to determine the
validity of the garnishment.

After hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the
garnishment had no validity as it was attempting to garnish
post-petition earnings.

The Bankruptcy Court ordered the

Defendants to pay to this Plaintiff some $20,000.00 in overdue
payments under the agreement or to be found in contempt of court
with stated penalties.

A payment of $20,300.00 was made to

Plaintiff by Defendants under that order.
Thereafter, on stipulation of both sides, the Order of
the Bankruptcy Court was vacated and the enforcement of the
consulting agreement between this Plaintiff and these Defendants
became the subject of a Complaint before this Court on April 23,
1990.

The Plaintiff's Complaint states simply that there is an

agreement between himself and the Defendants, that he is entitled
to payment under that agreement, that the Defendants have failed
and refused to pay as required under the agreement.

The Plaintiff

seeks Judgment for the amounts due under the agreement.

To that

Complaint the Defendants have filed an Answer and asserted a
Counterclaim.

The issue raised by the Answer and Counterclaim is

the issue which this Court must resolve in this decision, mainly
whether or not the agreement between the parties has any further
force or effect between these oarties.

The parties agree for purposes of this decision that the
agreement is in fact an executory contract within the meaning of
the bankruptcy lawsf that is was net assumed within 60 days of the
petition date by the trustee in bankruptcy, that by operation of
law the nonassumption meant that the contract had been rejected by
the trustee in bankruptcy, and that the Bankruptcy Court did not
rule on the issue of the effect of that rejection upon the rights
and obligations of these parties to the contract, under 11 U.S.C.,
Section 365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.
LEGAL ISSUE
The issue upon which the resolution of these Motions for
Summary Judgment turns is the effect of the rejection of the
executory contract by the trustee in bankruptcy.

Plaintiff

contends that such a rejection is merely a decision by the
bankruptcy trustee not to include the executory contract as an
asset (with a corresponding liability) in the estate of the
bankrupt.

Plaintiff contends further that the effect of the

rejection by the trustee is simply to leave the parties in the
position they were in prior to the rejection and thus seeks to
enforce the agreement.

Plaintiff contends he remains ready,

willing and able to perform consulting services and has never

breached the agreement.

Defendants contend that the rejection by

the trustee in bankruptcy has the effect, as a natter of law, of
terminating their obligations to perform under the contract.
Defendants cite 11 U.S.C. Section 365 for the proposition that the
rejection by the trustee constitutes a breach of the contract and
ends their obligations and rights thereunder except their right to
file a claim for damages with the trustee.

They assert therefore

in their Answer and Counterclaim that the contract is of no
further force and effect and Plaintiff has no right to pursue
payments under the agreement.
ANALYSIS
In support of Plaintiff's position counsel has referred
the Court to several cases and to the article by Michael T. Andrew
referred to above.

None of the cases appear dispositive of the

issue as it is apparent by the cases cited by the parties as well
as the cases cited by Mr. Andrew in his article that there is a
longstanding dispute among the Federal Judges as to the exact
effect of a rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in
bankruptcy.

Mr. Andrew, and the Plaintiff, contend the Federal

Courts has erred in their interpretation of 11 U.S.C, 365.
are cases cited by both sides which appear to support their

There

respective positions to some extent.

None of the cases cited

appear to be factually similar to this case.

(See In Re Knight, 3

B.R. 925 [1981] and In Re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2nd
1339 [1983]).
The Court is substantially persuaded by the article by
Mr. Andrew cited hereinabove that the doctrine of rejection of an
executory contract by a trustee did not originally include the
concept that the debtor and the non-debtor party to the contract
would have their rights and liabilities thereunder automatically
terminated by the rejection.

The Court is further substantially

persuaded that it was not the original intent to the Courts
involved in the development of the concept of rejection that the
statutory breach language contained in the present bankruptcy code
would somehow operate to terminate those rights and liabilities.
In fact, the arguments and policy considerations stated by Mr.
Andrew appear to make perfect sense to this Court.

However, this

Court is obligated to apply Federal Bankruptcy Law as it has been
interpreted by the Federal Courts to the best of its ability
rather than to apply a novel interpretation of that law in this
case.

This does not appear to be a case of first impression and

therefore this Court must follow Federal decisions.
In two cases the Federal Courts have apparently held
that rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in bankruptcy
has the effect of terminating the liabilities under the contract
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